Key Takeaway

MUJI (無印良品) — one of Japan's most recognizable brands — spent 24 years in Chinese courts and lost. A Chinese company registered the "无印良品" trademark in 2000 for textiles (Class 24) before MUJI even entered China. In June 2025, China's Supreme Court delivered the final blow: MUJI cannot sell towels, bedsheets, or any textile products under the "无印良品" name in China. If it can happen to MUJI, it can happen to any Japanese brand expanding into China.

A Tale of Two MUJIs

When you walk into a MUJI store in Shanghai, you see minimalist clothing, stationery, kitchenware, and furniture — all under the "MUJI 無印良品" brand. But something is missing. You will not find MUJI-branded towels or bed linens. Those belong to a different company: Beijing Cottonfield Textile Co., Ltd. (北京棉田).

The two "MUJIs" have coexisted in China for over two decades — one selling the full lifestyle experience minus textiles, the other owning the right to use "无印良品" for what was once a core product category for the original brand. This is not a case of counterfeiting. It is a case of first-to-file.

The Timeline: How MUJI Lost a 24-Year Battle

  • April 6, 2000: Beijing Cottonfield files for the "无印良品" trademark under Class 24 (textiles: towels, bed linens, fabric, etc.), designated trademark No. 1561046.
  • January 28, 2001: The trademark passes preliminary examination and is published.
  • 2005: MUJI (Ryohin Keikaku Co., Ltd.) officially enters the Chinese market. It is already 5 years too late for Class 24.
  • 2012: The Supreme Court first confirms the validity of Cottonfield's trademark at a retrial.
  • 2019–2022: MUJI continues losing appeals at the Beijing High Court. The court rules that MUJI infringes Cottonfield's trademark rights for Class 24 goods covered by No. 1561046.
  • June 23, 2025: The Supreme Court issues ruling (2024) Zuigao Fa Xing Shen No. 7358 — rejecting MUJI's final appeal. The 24-year legal war is over. MUJI lost.

Why MUJI Couldn't Win

The Supreme Court's reasoning was devastatingly simple:

1. No evidence of pre-2000 sales in China

MUJI argued it had been manufacturing MUJI-branded textile products in China since before 2000. The Court countered: those products were made in China but exported, never sold domestically. Without domestic sales, there is no "prior use" under Chinese law.

2. Brand fame overseas doesn't count in China

MUJI submitted massive evidence of its global brand recognition. The Court said: most of this evidence was either generated outside China or dated after April 2000. China's trademark system is territorial — what happens in Tokyo or London stays there.

3. Wrong product category

Even MUJI's evidence of Chinese media coverage was about the "無印良品" lifestyle brand in general — not specifically about textile products under Class 24. The Court requires category-specific evidence.

What This Means for MUJI and Japanese Brands

MUJI can still operate in China. It can still sell clothing (Class 25), furniture (Class 20), stationery (Class 16), and food (Class 29–30) under the "MUJI 無印良品" brand. What it cannot do is sell towels, bed linens, and fabric products with "无印良品" printed on them in China. That exclusive right belongs to Beijing Cottonfield.

For other Japanese brands considering China, the implications are clear:

1. Register Before You're Famous

MUJI's mistake was not failing to register — it was registering too late. By 2000, when Beijing Cottonfield filed, MUJI was already a well-known brand in Japan but had zero trademark presence in China. Japanese brands often underestimate the speed at which Chinese trademark squatters work.

2. Your Chinese Name Is a Separate Asset

In China, "MUJI" and "無印良品" are separate trademarks. Registering the Latin-alphabet brand is not enough — you must register the Chinese-character equivalent across all relevant classes. Many Japanese brands naturally have kanji-based names, making them vulnerable to this very type of squatting.

3. Made in China ≠ Selling in China

MUJI thought its contract manufacturing in China would count as "commercial activity." The Court clearly said: manufacturing for export does not establish trademark rights in China. You need actual sales to Chinese consumers.

4. Every Class Matters

Beijing Cottonfield only registered Class 24 — a single class out of 45. That single oversight cost MUJI 24 years of litigation and permanently locked it out of selling one of its most iconic product categories under its own name in its second-largest market.

How RTMCN Helps Japanese Brands Protect Themselves

At RTMCN, we specialize in helping international brands — especially Japanese and Korean companies — navigate China's first-to-file trademark system. Our approach for Japanese brands includes:

  • Pre-entry trademark search: Before you open a single store or ship a single product, we search CNIPA's database for conflicts with your Japanese brand name, Chinese name, and logo.
  • Multi-class registration strategy: For brands like MUJI with broad product lines, we recommend filing across all relevant classes simultaneously — not one at a time.
  • Chinese name strategy: Japanese kanji-based names create unique risks in China. We help you secure your Chinese name equivalents before anyone else can.
  • Opposition monitoring: Squatters don't stop. We continuously monitor new filings for attempts to register variations of your brand across all 45 classes.

Next Steps

If your Japanese brand is entering China — or already there — don't wait to discover that someone else owns your Chinese name.

*Don't let your brand become the next MUJI. A few hundred dollars of trademark registration today can save 24 years of litigation tomorrow.*